Articles by Will Bland, IV

Plaintiff’s Construction Defect Claims Against Offshore Spar Manufacturer Dismissed

In June 2011, an offshore worker was injured on a spar (a floating platform shaped like a giant buoy) on the outer continental shelf when he was struck in the face with the flange of a valve.  He filed a personal injury lawsuit against the manufacturer of the spar, McDermott, Inc., alleging his injury was caused by defective design and construction of the spar.

 

McDermott filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s right of action was perempted under Louisiana law.  McDermott asserted that because plaintiff was covered by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the law of the adjacent state (Louisiana) applied as a surrogate to federal law.  McDermott then pointed to a Louisiana statute, La. R.S. 9:2772, which provides a five year peremptive period in which to bring an action arising out of deficiencies in the design or construction of immovable property.  Because McDermott delivered the finished spar to its customer (plaintiff’s employer) in 2004, plaintiff’s design defect claim filed in 2013, was time barred.  The District Court agreed with McDermott and dismissed plaintiff’s claims.  Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

 

On appeal, plaintiff argued that La. R.S. 9:2772 did not apply to his claim because the spar was not an immovable, which was a matter of first impression for the Court.  The Fifth Circuit had previously determined that a spar is not a vessel for purposes of the Jones Act, but no court had ever addressed whether a spar is immovable property under Louisiana law.  The Court noted that fixed platforms are considered immovable property.  The Court further noted that the spar in question was permanently moored to the ocean floor, was intended to remain in its location for its twenty year life, and it would take months of planning to move the spar.  The Fifth Circuit concluded that enough similarities exist between a spar and fixed platform that a spar is immovable property under Louisiana law.  Thus, plaintiff’s design defect claims were dismissed as time barred by state law.

 

Hefren v. McDermott, Inc.

5th Circuit Finds Record Insufficient to Confirm OCSLA Situs in Indemnity Dispute

The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed the situs requirement of a personal injury claim arising under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).  Tetra Technologies was performing a salvage operation on a decommissioned oil production platform in the Gulf of Mexico and retained Vertex Services to assist with the project.  A rigger employed by Vertex was injured when he fell approximately 80 feet into the water.  He sued Tetra for personal injury and Tetra sought indemnity from Vertex pursuant to a Master Service Agreement between the two companies.  The District Court determined Tetra was entitled to indemnity from Vertex and Vertex appealed to the 5th Circuit.

 

On appeal, Vertex raised several arguments including that under OCSLA, Louisiana law was applicable and the indemnity agreement was voided under the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (LOIA).  The first question for the Court was whether OCSLA applied to this case such that Louisiana law should be applied as a surrogate to federal law.  The adoption of state law as a surrogate to federal law requires 1) that the controversy arise on a situs covered by OCSLA (such as a fixed platform on the outer continental shelf); 2) that federal maritime law must not apply of its own force; and 3) state law must not be inconsistent with federal law.  For the controversy to arise on a situs covered by OCSLA in a contractual dispute, the majority of the work performed under the contract must occur on a stationary platform or other OCSLA situs.

 

After reviewing the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the MSA, and the Salvage Plan, the Court was unable to conclude whether the majority of Vertex’s work was to be performed on an OCSLA situs.  The Court determined the record was inadequate and the case was remanded to the District Court for further evaluation of this dispositive question.

 

Tetra Technologies v. Continental Insurance Co.

Fifth Circuit: Who “Invited” Plaintiff on the Vessel?

The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed competing indemnification provisions in a maritime contract.  A pipeline operator, W&T Offshore, hired a diving contractor, Triton Diving Services, for an offshore pipeline decommissioning project.  Triton provided their own vessel and personnel, but operated under W&T’s instruction pursuant to a Master Service Contract.  W&T also hired a safety contractor, Tiger Safety, to assist with filtration of pipeline fluids.  An employee of Tiger was working on Triton’s vessel under supervision of W&T when he fell and injured himself. 

The Tiger employee sued both W&T and Triton in U.S. District Court.  W&T and Triton filed cross-claims against one another seeking defense and indemnity based on their Master Service Contract.  W&T had agreed to indemnify Triton for personal injury claims brought by members of the “W&T Group”.  Likewise Triton had agreed to indemnify W&T for personal injury claims brought by members of the “contractor group”.  The contract defined the “contractor group” to include Triton’s “invitees on the work sites” and “W&T Group” included W&T’s “invitees on the work sites”.  The indemnification question therefore boiled down to whether the Tiger employee was an “invitee” of W&T or Triton.  At the time of the accident, the Tiger employee was working on Triton’s vessel under the direction of Triton personnel, but he was hired by W&T and was being monitored by a W&T employee also on the vessel. 

The District Court sided with Triton, finding that the plaintiff was W&T’s invitee and W&T appealed to the Fifth Circuit.  On appeal, the Court confirmed that the Master Service Contract was a maritime contract and turned to Fifth Circuit precedent that defined “invitee” as “a person who goes onto premises with the expressed or implied invitation of the occupant, on business of the occupant or for their mutual advantage”.  The Court concluded that even though the plaintiff was injured on Triton’s vessel, he was a W&T invitee because he was hired by W&T and was working under the supervision of W&T.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s finding that W&T owed Triton defense and indemnity. 

Grogan v. W&T Offshore   

Sloppy Pleading of Injured Worker Leads to Dismissal of Lawsuit

Plaintiff was working in the hold of a refrigerated cargo vessel that was berthed at the Port of Gloucester, NJ.  He injured his leg when it was crushed under machinery.  He filed suit in U.S. District Court in New Jersey and named eight companies as defendants.  The Complaint did not allege the specific roles of each defendant and instead generally plead that each company “owned, leased, operated, managed, possessed and/or controlled” the vessel.  Plaintiff lodged similar allegations regarding the defendants’ ownership and operation of the port.  Plaintiff cited three causes of action including negligence for violation of twenty-four duties, Section 905(b) of the LHWCA, and loss of consortium on behalf of Plaintiff’s spouse.

 

One Defendant filed a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, arguing the Complaint failed to provide notice of which particular claims were being lodged against it.  The Complaint merely lumped all defendants together and accused them of the same general negligent conduct.  The Defendant also argued the Complaint failed to include any factual basis that it owned the vessel, as required for a Section 905(b) claim.

 

After thoroughly reviewing the Complaint, the Court found that it failed to separate out the liability of each defendant.  The Court noted that if the Complaint had merely described the nature of each defendant company and what they were responsible for, it might have been possible to at least infer a theory of liability.  Instead,  Plaintiff had merely lumped all defendants together and asserted general allegations against broadly against the group.  The Court granted Defendant’s motion and dismissed the Complaint without prejudice.

 

Sheeran v. Blyth Shipholding