Vessel Owner Exonerated by Divine Intervention

A common defense in maritime personal injury and property damage litigation is the “Act of God,” also known as force majeure.  It is premised on the argument that the event causing an injury or loss is the result an extraordinary and unexpected manifestation of the forces of nature that was unforeseeable and could not have been protected against by reasonable diligence.  The trouble is, more often than not marine casualties are at least partly the result of some substandard human conduct; and when a party’s own negligence or wrong-doing contributes to a casualty, it will not be exonerated by blaming an Act of God.  Consequently, this defense is rarely successful.

But this approach worked in the case of Wendelboe v. Seariver Maritime, Inc., et al.  In that case, Seariver prevailed in a lawsuit brought by the chief engineer/safety coordinator of the Exxon New Orleans who was injured after being battered by an unusually large wave that crashed over the ship’s main deck.  Another crew member was washed from the deck and lost at sea by the same wave.

The chief engineer sought to hold Seariver liable, arguing that the accident resulted from its negligence in exposing him to the risk of harm or because of some unseaworthiness of the ship.  The court rejected the claims of fault by Seariver and instead found that the accident was caused by a rogue wave that occurred during a relatively calm spell after a recent period of rough weather.  The court also observed that Seariver had shipboard practices and policies in place to promote the safety of its crew during expected heavy sea conditions.  Because the accident was caused by an unexpected and unusual natural force, without any culpability on the part of Seariver, the chief engineer had no basis to recover against Seariver.

A defendant bears a difficult burden in proving that an accident was caused solely by an “Act of God.” To succeed with this defense, the defendant must prove that the accident was attributable to natural causes and that it was not negligent in contributing to the accident.  Seariver Maritime met this heavy burden in this case and was found to be free from fault, accordingly.

Note: This article first appeared in WorkBoat magazine, and it can be found on WorkBoat’s website.

Supreme Court Addresses Vessel Status (Again)

The United States Supreme Court addresses only about one percent of the cases brought before it.  So it is significant when the Court takes up an issue affecting our industry.  In January, the Court issued an opinion in the maritime case of Lozman v. City of Rivera Beach.

The central issue in the Lozman case pertained to whether the petitioner’s floating home was a vessel.  The houseboat’s “status” was critical for the City of Riveria Beach’s claim for dockage fees and trespass that were based on the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction.

Courts have struggled with what is and isn’t a vessel nearly as long as industry has transported people and cargo by sea.  Seven years ago, the Supreme Court tried to clarify the definition in Stewart v. Dutra Construction, when it suggested that virtually anything capable of carrying persons and/or goods across water may qualify as a vessel.  The Lozman court has further refined the vessel status test, favoring a practicality based analysis.

Lozman’s houseboat was afloat and capable of towage across water,  characteristics which the lower courts found were sufficient to make it a vessel.  The Supreme Court disagreed.  It declared that the vessel status issue should be decided by analyzing whether a reasonable observer, looking to the structure’s physical characteristics and activities, could consider it designed “to a practical degree” for carrying people or things over water.  Such purposes were not the intended or actual uses of Lozman’s floating home.  Therefore, it did not meet the legal standards for vessel status.

Vessel status has far reaching legal ramifications and is relevant for establishing admiralty jurisdiction, determining seaman status, creating maritime liens, and pursuing other rights and remedies unique to admiralty law and maritime commerce.  However, as the Lozman  case demonstrates, the vessel status issue can be complicated and is often determined on a case by case basis.

Note: This article first appeared in WorkBoat Magazine.  It is also available on WorkBoat’s website.

Non-Signatory to Contract Bound By Arbitration Clause

With increasing frequency, mandatory arbitration clauses are being written into maritime contracts.  You may have run across them in charter parties, towage and salvage agreements, articles of employment and even cruise line tickets.  Nowadays, people are more willing to embrace arbitration over formal litigation for dispute resolution because it is typically perceived as less expensive and more “user friendly.”  Recently, however, cases out of the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have broadened the potential reach of mandatory arbitration clauses contained in contracts.

In the Fifth Circuit case of Todd v. Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association, Ltd., the court found that a mandatory arbitration clause contained in an insurance agreement between Delta Queen Steamboat Co. and its liability insurer could be enforced against a Delta Queen employee.  The significance of that holding is that the court concluded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable against the employee who was not even a party to the contract that contained the arbitration requirement.  In that case, the employee had successfully sued Delta Queen, but was unable to recover his monetary award because of Delta Queen’s bankruptcy.  Therefore, he filed a direct suit against Delta Queen’s insurer to recover the sums to which he was found to be entitled.  Relying on a clause in its insurance policy, Steamship Mutual argued that it was not subject to suit by the employee because of the mandatory arbitration requirement.  The employee countered that the arbitration clause was not applicable to him because he was not a party to that insurance contract.

Guided by the U. S. Supreme Court decision Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, the Fifth Circuit concluded that under some circumstances, a third party can, in fact, be bound by the contractual obligations created between other parties.  On instruction from the Fifth Circuit, the district court painstakingly considered the applicable state and English laws that were applicable to the insurance policy and concluded that the employee could be bound by the policy language because he was basically seeking to enforce and benefit from that contract between Delta Queen and the insurer.  As a “third party beneficiary”, the employee was bound by the terms of the contract, even though he was not a party to that contract.

While the Todd and Carlisle cases do not stand for the enforcement of arbitration clauses against third parties in all situations, they signal a trend toward compelling alternative dispute resolution in cases where there is a significantly close relationship between the parties to the contract and a third party against whom the arbitration is sought to be enforced.  Thus, when entering into contracts, be aware that your own rights and remedies may be influenced by other relationships of those with whom you are dealing.

Note: this article first appeared in WorkBoat magazine, and the electronic version of the article is also available on WorkBoat‘s website.

Rig Operator Not Liable for Employee’s Shooting

Vicarious liability is a rule of law which provides that one person can be held responsible for the negligent acts of another.  A superior-subordinate relationship, such as between an employer and employee or a parent and child, is necessary for vicarious liability to apply.  The extent of an employer’s vicarious liability for the negligent acts of its employee was recently tested in the maritime case of Beech v. Hercules Drilling.

In that case, Hercules Drilling’s employee inadvertently brought a gun with him aboard the drilling rig.  This was in violation of an express company rule prohibiting the possession of firearms on the job.  While on duty, the employee was showing off the gun when it accidentally discharged, killing the co-worker. 

The decedent’s widow brought a wrongful death suit against Hercules Drilling, claiming that Hercules was vicariously liable for the negligent act of the employee.  The District Court sided with the widow and determined that Hercules Drilling could be responsible for the accident because its employee was within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the incident.  That ruling was appealed and reversed by the U. S. Fifth Circuit Court.

In addressing inconsistent standards regarding the limits of an employer’s vicarious liability, the Fifth Circuit held that the test for whether a maritime employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment is whether his actions at the time of the wrongful conduct were in furtherance of his employer’s business interests.  Under the facts of this case, the Fifth Circuit observed that employee’s negligent possession and firing of a gun were actions beyond the scope of his employment and did not further any interests of the employer.  Accordingly, Hercules Drilling could not be held liable for the incident.

Maritime employers’ potential liability for the negligent acts of their employees under vicarious liability principles is broad.  However, the Hercules Drilling case is significant in that it recognizes limits on the extent of such liability.  This case makes clear that vicarious liability will not attach where an employee’s conduct is not sufficiently related to some objective of employer’s operations.

Note: This article is also available in the December 2012 issue of WorkBoat magazine and on WorkBoat’s website.